Rafael Stofer, 31-Jan-06 @ 17:12PM

Also read the article on this website :

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005_Hertfordshire_Oil_Storage_Terminal_fire

Rene Stach, 12-Jan-06 @ 16:16PM

New comment

asdasd äöü½ "; test

Ed Mitchell, 21-Dec-05 @ 10:55AM

Report after Buncefield has begun

Not strictly about the firefighters knowledge during the fire, but an independent report is underway, which will "..."make recommendations for future action to ensure the effective management and regulation of major action risk" at sites similar to Buncefield....". Article here. I wonder what that would uncover and how that information would be shared afterwards?

Debbie Auer, 16-Dec-05 @ 12:21PM

ICS

Quick question first does the UK have a system similar to our incident command system or National Incident Management System?
In regards to the Oil Storage Terminal fires you may want to do a search for Texas Oil Rig fires for cases in the USA.
Another great website is Williams Fire and Hazard co., which is a company that supplies industrial firefighting services. Since its inception, Williams Fire & Hazard Control has traveled the Gulf of Mexico, the North Atlantic, Africa, the Orient, the Pacific Rim and beyond to respond to Land and Marine fire emergencies. (www.williamsfire.com/aboutus/aboutus.html)

As for whether or not it could have been prevented, whose to say?
Knowledge and pre-plan are about the best weapons we have. Unfortunately most of the knowledge and lessons we gain when it comes to fires or emergency situations is reactive, and comes after tragedy.
In the FF classes it is emphasized that you need to pre-plan, take the initiative to learn the hazards within your community and plan for the worst-case scenario. And once you design a plan, get input from technical specialists, this could be manufacturers who deal with the products daily, chemists, industrial firefighters, etc. Get other companies involved and train, train, train. A plan has to not just work on paper, but allow all companies involved, including anticipated mutual aid, to understand it and know how to act. One other thing is to understand a plan is just that a plan, it has to be flexible, unless you are all-seeing and all-knowing, you can't predict everything.
I hope I gave you some things to start with, and that it helps.

John O'Meara, 16-Dec-05 @ 07:40AM

ethanol tank fire - Australia

This might be of interest.

START
Australian Fire Authorities Council Newsletter no. 21 – Jan/Feb 2004

http://www.afac.com.au/news/newsletter.html

NSW Fire Brigades battles ethanol tank fire

On the morning of 28 January, the NSWFB was called to an explosion and fire at a tank farm at Port Kembla (Wollongong) involving a 7 million litre ethanol tank.

Upon arrival, first arriving fire crews found that the roof of the tank had been blown off, and had landed on valves for the fixed foam and water installations, rendering them inoperative throughout the ensuing 20 hour operation.

Radiant heat from the blazing tank was heating adjoining tanks containing ethanol and fuel oil. The response was escalated to an 8th Alarm, with a separate 3rd Alarm responded for fireground support. A total of over 150 firefighters and 30 appliances was in attendance at the height of the blaze, with support sent from Sydney.

NSWFB Commissioner Greg Mullins flew to the scene from Sydney in the NSWFB's new helicopter, and took charge of operations. A full Incident Management Team was instigated under the ICS framework. Initial operations focussed on exposure protection, while additional foam stocks were amassed. A foam tender from Kingsford Smith Airport in Sydney was requested to assist, and the offer to use an Ericson Skycrane was also accepted.

An all-out foam attack from the ground and air at 1700 hours was unsuccessful, as fluoro-protein and AFFF foam was rapidly broken down by the heat and polar solvent. Two fall-back strategies had been devised as it was considered unlikely that the first foam attack would succeed. The fall-backs were (1) an attack using alcohol tolerant compound (ATC); (2) allow the fire to burn itself out while protecting exposures.

While ATC stocks were sourced by the Logistics section, the fire was allowed to burn, reducing product levels. At 0600 hours the next day, a concerted attack was launched from the ground (the Ericson Skycrane was not used).

The attack involved, firstly, directing high volume water streams into the tank to dilute the ethanol. Laser thermometers and thermal imaging cameras soon detected a significant temperature drop. An all-out ATC attack using aerial monitors, ground monitors and the airport crash tender then successfully extinguished the blaze within minutes.
END

John.